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Comments
The Reform of Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
There exists a clear consensus among many members of the legal
community that some type of reform is needed regarding Federal
Habeas Corpus in capital cases. The fundamental question is
which reform proposal or combination of reform proposals ade-
quately addresses the complicated myriad of issues and concerns
associated with this controversial topic. This comment begins with
a brief outline of the key legislative and judicial concepts concern-
ing federal habeas corpus in an effort to set the stage for a discus-
sion of the problems associated with federal habeas corpus and the
proposals to reform the problems. The comment will then discuss
some of the general problems associated with the current system of
federal habeas corpus in capital cases. Following this discussion,
the substantive content of the following reform proposals will be
analyzed: The Judicial Conference of the United States Ad Hoc
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases (The Pow-
ell Committee Report),' The Recommendations and Report of the
American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus (Task Force Report),2 and the American Bar Association
Criminal Justice Section Report (ABA Report).' A conclusion is
1. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal (August 1989).
2. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases (October 1989). (This report is not the official position of the
American Bar Association or The Criminal Justice Section.)
3. American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Dele-
gates (February 1990). (This report was approved by the American Bar Association House
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preceded by a brief section detailing some of the advantages and
disadvantages of each proposal.
II. KEY CONCEPTS OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Generally speaking, habeas corpus is a procedure whereby a per-
son who is convicted in the proceedings of a state court, challenges
the state court judgment or sentence in federal court on the
grounds that the judgment or sentence violated the Constitution or
laws of the United States.4 The review of state court decisions in
federal court under habeas corpus is not a requirement of the
United States Constitution,' but is statutory, originating with The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.6 Many of the concepts that define fed-
eral habeas corpus occurred after passage of The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, therefore, this date will serve as a starting point in
discussing these concepts.
The first of these concepts is the exhaustion of state remedies.
While this concept is now codified under federal law,7 the principle
was first espoused in 1886 in Ex parte Royall8 and clearly articu-
lated in Urquhart v Brown:9
of Delegates in February of 1990.)
4. 28 USC § 2241 (1988) entitled, "Power to grant writ," provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
5. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 4, note 2 (August 1989).
6. 14 Stat 385 (1867).
7. 28 USC § 2254(b) (1988) entitled, "State custody; remedies in federal courts," pro-
vides: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless . . . the applicant has ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . ."
8. 117 US 241 (1886). The petitioner, a New York resident and owner of bonds issued
by the state of Virginia, was arrested in Virginia for selling one of the coupons without a
license. Id at 242. He petitioned a federal circuit court in Virginia for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming his detention was in violation of the United States Constitution. Id at 243.
The federal circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id at 245. The Su-
preme Court of the United States held that the federal court had jurisdiction. Id at 250.
However, noting that the federal court had discretion as to the time and mode in which it
could exercise its jurisdiction, the Court stated:
That discretion should be exercised in light of the relations existing, under our sys-
tem of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and
in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not
disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect
rights secured by the Constitution.
Id at 251.
9. 205 US 179 (1907). The appellee was convicted in a state court on murder charges
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[A] Federal Court . . . will not ordinarily interfere by habeas corpus with
the regular course of procedure under state authority, but will leave the ap-
plicant for the writ of habeas corpus to exhaust the remedies afforded by
the state for determining whether he is illegally restrained of his liberty.10
The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies is rooted in the
principle of comity. "[The] doctrine of comity . . . [is] a doctrine
which teaches that one court should defer action on causes prop-
erly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation,
have had an opportunity to pass on the matter."'1 A state court's
cognizance of a claim requires that the claim be presented to the
state court.
[T]he federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts ... [o]nly
if the state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to
be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of
the exhaustion of state remedies. Accordingly, we have required a state pris-
oner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the fed-
eral courts. 2
Absent a presentation of an issue to a state court, that state
court would not have had the opportunity to address the matter.
Therefore, a federal habeas petitioner presenting his claims for the
first time in federal proceedings will not have exhausted his state
remedies.
Closely related to the exhaustion of state remedies concept is the
concept of the mixed petition. A mixed petition is one that in-
cludes both exhausted and unexhausted claims.13 In Rose v
Lundy," the United States Supreme Court held that a "total ex-
and acquitted by a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. An order of court, based
on a state statute authorizing detention when acquitted by reason of insanity, committed
the appellee to a prison. Id. The appellee made an application to the Washington Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his confinement violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id at 180. The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton found the statute constitutional and denied the application. Id. The appellee petitioned
and the federal court granted a writ of habeas corpus finding, although the state statute was
constitutional, the statute was improperly administered because the petitioner was denied a
fair opportunity to defend himself against the insanity charges. Id at 180-181. The state
appealed the decision of the federal court to the Supreme Court of the United States which
reversed, holding that the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies before making his
habeas application to the federal court. Id at 182-183.
10. Id at 181.
11. Darr v Burford, 339 US 200, 204 (1950).
12. Picard v Connor, 404 US 270, 275-76 (1971).
13. Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 516 (1982).
14. 455 US 509 (1982). Following trial and conviction, the respondent filed a petition
in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254 alleging four grounds
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haustion rule promotes comity and does not unreasonably impair
the prisoner's right to relief, . . . [therefore] a district court must
dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and ex-
hausted claims. ' 5 The Court noted that requiring dismissal where
exhausted and unexhausted claims are presented will relieve the
district court of sorting out the claims.' 6 Justice O'Connor stated:
"A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state
prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving
those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitu-
tional error.'
17
Closely associated with the concept of exhaustion of state reme-
dies is the concept of procedural default.'" Most states have rules
that require a litigant to use proper state procedures for raising a
claim.' 9 Failure to comply with these state procedural rules often
results in a state court refusing to reach the merits of a forfeited
claim in state appeal and post-conviction proceedings2 ° A state's
interest in enforcing these procedural rules is promoting finality
and respect for its judicial proceedings.2' Therefore, if the federal
habeas petitioner failed to raise an issue at a state trial, appeal, or
collateral proceeding, for which he is procedurally defaulted, he is,
in effect, unable to raise the issue in a federal habeas petition. In
1963, this concept was redefined by the United States Supreme
Court in Fay v Noia.22 In Fay v Noia, the Court held that a federal
for relief, two of which had not been exhausted. Id at 510-511. The federal district court
considered instances of prosecutorial misconduct that had not been challenged in the state
trial or appellate court or raised in the federal habeas petition. Id at 513. The question
presented was whether a federal district court in a habeas corpus petition, pursuant to 28
USC section 2254, should hear a petition that presents both exhausted and unexhausted
claims. Id.
15. Id at 522.
16. Id at 519.
17. Id at 518-19.
18. 28 USC § 2254(c) provides: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law of the
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
19. Howard P. Fink and Mark V. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice
952 (Michie, 2d ed 1987).
20. Id.
21. Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 487 (1986).
22. 372 US 391 (1963). The respondent and two other defendants were convicted of
murder in state court proceedings based primarily on their signed confessions. Id at 394-395.
The two other defendants appealed their convictions, but the respondent did not. Id at 395.
The two other defendants were released in subsequent legal proceedings on a finding that
the confessions were coerced in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Even though
the coercive nature of the confessions was stipulated, the federal district court denied the
respondent's petition for writ of habeas corpus because by failing to appeal his conviction,
Vol. 29:61
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court's jurisdiction to consider a petition for habeas corpus which
raises a constitutional claim is not affected by the procedural de-
faults committed during a state court proceeding,, unless the failure
to raise the claim was due to "deliberate bypass."2 A deliberate
bypass is a tactical or strategic device employed by a state peti-
tioner in an effort to subvert or evade the adjudication of federal
defenses in a state judicial system in order to raise the issue in
federal court.
24
In 1977, the deliberate bypass test was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court in Wainwright v Sykes.2 5 The Court ad-
dressed the general principles of federalism, comity and finality re-
garding a state court's procedural rules.26 Justice Rehnquist stated:
"[tihe state trial on the merits [should be] the 'main event,' so to
speak, rather than a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be the
determinative federal habeas hearing. '27 As stated by the majority:
[Tihe rule of Fay v Noia . . . may encourage 'sandbagging'on the part of
defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a
state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a fed-
eral habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off."5
The Court in Wainwright v Sykes substituted a "cause and
prejudice" standard for the "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v
Noia. 9 Under the cause and prejudice standard, a state prisoner
the respondent had not exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 USC section 2254. Id
at 395-396. The question presented was whether the failure of a state prisoner to follow
state procedural rules, resulting in a state court's decline to reach the merits of a federal
defense, bars that petitioner from seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Id at 399.
23. Id at 435.
24. Id at 439.
25. 433 US 72 (1977). The respondent was convicted of murder based on his own testi-
mony and oral statements to police after receiving Miranda warnings. Id at 74. At no time
during trial was the admissability of the respondent's statements to the police challenged as
a misunderstanding of his Miranda warnings. Id at 75. The respondent appealed the convic-
tion but did not challenge the admissability of the statements. Id. The respondent then
filed, in trial court, a motion to vacate his conviction and, in the state appeals and supreme
court, for a state writ of habeas corpus. Id. Having failed in state appeal and collateral
proceedings on the voluntariness issue, the respondent petitioned the federal district court
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254 on the grounds that his statements
were inadmissible due to his failure to understand the Miranda warnings. Id. The federal
district court stayed issuance of the writ pending a state court hearing on the voluntariness
issue. Id at 76. The petitioner appealed this decision to the federal court of appeals which
found that a deliberate bypass did not occur and affirmed the district court order. Id at 76-
77.
26. Id at 88-90.
27. Id at 90.
28. Id at 89.
29. Id at 84.
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who did not properly raise a claim in state court could assert the
claim in federal court if he could make a showing of cause for non-
compliance with state procedures and that such cause resulted in
actual prejudice.30 However, the Court left open for future consid-
eration the precise meaning of what constitutes "cause" and
"prejudice. ,31
In Reed v Ross, 32 the United States Supreme Court held that the
novelty of a legal claim could constitute cause. "[W]here a consti-
tutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably
available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise
the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures." ' How-
ever, whether ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause
was addressed in Murray v Carrier.35 The question presented in
Murray was whether a petitioner can show cause for a procedural
default, in federal habeas proceedings, by showing that the failure
to raise a substantive claim was due to inadvertence rather than
deliberate tactical design.36 The Supreme Court held that absent
ineffectiveness of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a proce-
dural default due to ineffective assistance of counsel through error
or inadvertence will not rise to the level of "cause."3 " The Court
recognized an exception to this rule. Justice O'Connor stated:
We remain confident that, for the most part, "victims of a fundamental mis-
carriage of justice will meet the cause and prejudice standard" ... [b]ut we
30. Id.
31. Id at 87.
32. 468 US 1 (1984). In 1969, the respondent was convicted of murder by a state court.
Id at 3. At trial, the respondent claimed lack of malice and self defense, and the trial judge
instructed the jury that the respondent had the burden of proving these defenses. Id. Six
years later the Supreme Court of the United States, in Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684
(1975), held that requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving malice was violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Two years later the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Hankerson v North Carolina, 432 US 233 (1977), held that Mullaney was to be applied
retroactively. Id. The question presented was whether the respondent's attorney forfeited
the respondent's claim for relief under Mullaney by failing, before the case was decided, to
raise or appeal the unconstitutionality of the burden-of-proof question. Id.
33. Id at 16.
34. Id.
35. 477 US 478 (1986). The respondent was convicted of rape in state court proceed-
ings. Id at 482. Before trial, respondent's counsel made a motion for, and was denied, dis-
covery of the victim's statements to the police describing her assailant. Id. The respondent's
counsel filed a notice of appeal assigning seven errors for consideration, one of which re-
garded denial of discovery of the victim's statements. Id. Upon submitting the required pe-
tition for appeal, and without consulting the respondent, respondent's counsel failed to in-
clude the claim relating to the victim's statements. Id.
36. Id at 483.
37. Id at 488.
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do not pretend that this will always be true. Accordingly, we think that in
an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably re-
sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas
corpus court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause
for the procedural default.8
Another concept that is integral in federal habeas corpus is res
judicata. Basically, res judicata is a rule whereby a final judgment
by a court on the merits of a claim is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties, and constitutes an absolute bar against a subsequent
action on the same claim e.3  The concept of res judicata is not a
limitation on the availability of a writ of habeas corpus." "The
doctrine of res judicata has long been thought to be inapplicable to
habeas corpus proceedings.""1 As stated in Salinger v Loisel,42 "At
common law the doctrine of res judicata did not extend to a deci-
sion on habeas corpus refusing to discharge the prisoner .. and
this Court has conformed to it and thereby sanctioned it . .. 3
Therefore, after a final decision by a state court on matters prop-
erly raised at trial, a federal habeas court can redecide the issue
unhampered by any rules of preclusion.
The following concepts, basically statutory in nature, will be
given cursory treatment in order to lay the foundation for a discus-
sion of the problems and the reform proposals addressing some of
the problems. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive.
The successive petition doctrine basically provides that a district
or circuit judge is not required to entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus if it appears that the legality of the deten-
tion was determined by a judge or court of the United States on a
prior application for the writ of habeas corpus, and no new
grounds are presented which would require the writ to issue."" The
abuse of writ doctrine is analogous to the successive petition doc-
trine, and provides that a federal court is not required to hear a
factual matter not previously raised if it appears that an earlier
38. Id at 495-496 (quoting Engle v Issac, 456 US 107, 135 (1982)).
39. Black's Law Dictionary 1174 (West, 5th ed 1979).
40. Ronald P. Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus 157-59 (Mitchie, 2d ed 1969).
41. Id.
42. 265 US 224, 230 (1924).
43. Id.
44. 28 USC § 2244(a) (1988) entitled, "Finality of determination," provides: "No cir-
cuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus
... if it appears that the legality of the detention has been determined . . . on a prior
application . . . and the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and
determined . . ."
1990
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application failed to assert the request for relief. 5 The presump-
tion of correctness doctrine basically provides that in proceedings
in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner in
custody pursuant to a state court judgment, the merits of a factual
issue evidenced by a written finding shall be presumed to be cor-
rect unless the petitioner can establish one of eight categories dis-
puting the factual correctness."'
One final concept that must be addressed, regarding federal
habeas corpus in capital cases, is the question of retroactivity for
cases on collateral review. The question involves whether a new
constitutional right, decided after a state prisoner's conviction be-
comes final, may be used by that state prisoner in federal or state
collateral proceedings. The situation arises when a state provides a
trial based on protecting a defendant's constitutional rights as
then understood, and convicts the defendant based on that under-
standing; however, a federal court later decides a case that requires
new constitutional procedures that are analogous to the situation
in which the prisoner's conviction became final.47 Does the state
have to release the prisoner in habeas proceedings and hold a sec-
ond trial complying with the new constitutional law?" Teague v
Lane" and Penry v Lynaugh5° embody the current rules regarding
45. Id. 28 USC § 2244(b) (1988) provides in part:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a
hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States, . . . release
from custody . . . on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent applica-
tion. . . need not be entertained . . . unless the application alleges and is predicated
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on . . . the earlier application for the
writ, and unless the court . . . is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier
application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the
writ.
46. Id. 28 USC § 2254(d) (1988) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgement of a State court, a determi-
nation after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, writ-
ten opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be
correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the re-
spondent shall admit ...
47. Federal Courts Study Committee, Vol 1 Working Papers and Subcommittee Re-
ports 485 (July 1990).
48. Id.
49. 109 S Ct 1060 (1989). The petitioner, a black person, was convicted of murder by
an all white jury. Id at 1065. The prosecutor used all of his preemptory challenges to exclude
blacks from the jury. Id. The petitioner appealed the conviction arguing that the prosecu-
tor's use of his preemptory challenges denied him his right to be tried by a jury representa-
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the concept of retroactivity in collateral proceedings.
In Teague v Lane, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that when a case has become final, any new constitutional rules of
procedure announced after such final decision will not be retroac-
tively applicable in collateral proceedings. 1 The Court adopted
Justice Harlan's position, as developed in Desist v United States,
52
that federal habeas corpus serves to deter trial and appellate
judges from conducting proceedings inconsistent with constitu-
tional principles. 53 "In order to perform this deterrence function,
the habeas court need . . . only apply the constitutional standards
that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place." 5
Any new rule announced by the Court after the defendant's con-
viction becomes final can not be applied retroactively. What is new
law for purposes of retroactivity analysis? Justice O'Connor stated:
A case announces new law when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or federal government ... To put it differently, a
case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent ex-
isting at the time the defendant's conviction became final (emphasis in
original).55
Justice O'Connor set forth two exceptions to the rule of retroactiv-
tive of the community. Id. Petitioner then filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus repeating
his fair cross section claim. Id. The petitioner argued that under Swain v Alabama, 380 US
202 (1965), which prohibited states from denying blacks the opportunity to sit on juries, a
prosecutor could be questioned on his use of preemptory challenges. Id at 1066. The district
court rejected the claim, and the petitioner appealed to the federal court of appeals, which
voted to rehear the case en banc after Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). Id. After
Batson, which overruled parts of Swain, the federal court of appeals held that the petitioner
could not benefit from Batson because Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) held that Batson
could not be retroactively applied on collateral review. Id.
50. 109 S Ct 2934 (1989). The petitioner was charged with rape and murder. Id at
2941. The petitioner, of low IQ, was found competent to stand trial. Id. Thereafter, the jury
rejected the petitioner's insanity defense and found him guilty. Id at 2942. During the pen-
alty phase, the defense counsel objected to the proposed charge to the jury on issues of
inadequate definitions and mitigating circumstances, but was overruled. Id at 2942-43. The
petitioner was sentenced to death, and then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus challeng-
ing his death sentence. Id at 2943. The questions presented were: 1) whether the death
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution because of the inadequacy of
the jury instructions defining terms and mitigating factors, and 2) whether it is cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution to execute a person
with the petitioner's reasoning ability. Id at 2943-44. Since the petition was for a writ of
habeas corpus, the Court decided the threshold question of whether the relief sought was
new law, precluded in collateral review by Teague v Lane, 109 S Ct 1060 (1989). Id at 2944.
51. Teague, 109 S Ct at 1078.
52. 394 US 244 (1969).
53. Id at 262-63.
54. Id at 263.
55. Teague, 109 S Ct at 1070.
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ity. The first exception is for new rules that place "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the crimi-
nal law making authority to proscribe. ' 56 The second exception is
for new rules "without which the likelihood of an accurate convic-
tion is seriously diminished. '57 Furthermore, the Court declared
that retroactivity should be decided as a threshold matter.5 8 If a
petitioner's claim seeks or would result in the announcement of
"new law," the habeas petitioner shall not be entitled to raise the
claim.59 According to Justice O'Connor: "Retroactivity is properly
treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to
the defendant in the case announcing the rule, even-handed justice
requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly sit-
uated."60 Penry v Lynaugh is important because, whereas Teague
v Lane was a plurality opinion, Penry was a majority decision
which applied the Teague principles.6" Furthermore, Penry applied
Teague to decisions involving capital sentencing.
62
III. GENERAL PROBLEMS
Consider some statistics regarding the subject. "There are ap-
proximately twenty-two hundred convicted murderers on death
row awaiting execution. 6 3 Since 1972,64 one hundred sixteen ex-
ecutions have taken place.6 5 The shortest of these death sentence
proceedings took two years and nine months to complete; the long-
est, fourteen years and two months; the average is eight years and
two months.6 According to the Powell Committee Report, "an
analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and
Texas shows that eighty percent of the time spent in collateral liti-
gation in death penalty cases occurs outside of state collateral pro-
56. Id at 1075.
57. Id at 1076-1077.
58. Id at 1069.
59. Id.
60. Id at 1069-70.
61. Penry, 109 S Ct at 2944.
62. Id.
63. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 3 (August 1989).
64. In 1972, Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) was decided which challenged the
constitutionality of the death penalty. Id at 240. In 1976, Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153
(1976) affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty on the condition that certain safe-
guards, incident to its proper implementation, were provided. Id at 206-207.
65. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas




ceedings." 7 As a result, "the present system of collateral review
operates to frustrate the law of thirty seven states. '6 8 However,
note that under certain circumstances, capital punishment is pro-
vided for under federal law.69
According to the statement of Justice Powell:
*The hard fact is that the laws of 37 states are not being enforced by the
courts. About 20,000 murders are committed in our country each year. Only
a fraction of the worst murderers--aeven those convicted-are sentenced to
die.. . . I respect those who argue for the outright abolition of death pun-
ishment[,] [b]ut it seems irrational to retain the penalty and frustrate its
fair implementation. . . .Capital cases should be subject to one fair and
complete course of collateral review through the state and federal systems.
7
Before listing the general problems with the current system of
federal habeas corpus in capital cases, an example of one case
might shed light on the magnitude of the concerns of those seeking
reform.
In February of 1981, in the case of People v Harris,71 the defend-
ant appealed to the California Supreme Court a March, 1979 judg-
ment of a state trial court imposing the death penalty, following
the defendant's conviction of kidnapping, robbery, the first degree
murders of two teenage boys, receiving stolen property and the
possession of a concealed firearm by an ex-felon incident to the
defendant's failed attempt to rob a bank in 1978.72 The Supreme
Court of California affirmed the conviction. 73 The California Su-
preme Court denied the defendant's petition for state writ of
habeas corpus which was filed simultaneously with his automatic
appeal (first state petition).74 The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 7 In November of 1981, the Superior Court of
San Diego County denied the defendant a second state petition for
writ of habeas corpus (second state petition). 76 The California Su-
preme Court denied review of the state superior court decision re-
jecting the second state petition. 77 On March 5, 1982, the defend-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 USC § 848(e) (1988).
70. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Statement of Justice Powell, 2-3 (September 21, 1989).
71. 28 Cal 3d 935, 171 Cal Rptr 679, 623 P2d 240 (1981).
72. Harris, 623 P2d at 243.
73. Harris v Pulley, 852 F2d 1546, 1550 (9th Cir 1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. (See Harris v California, 454 US 882 (1986)).




ant filed for federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section
2254 in a federal district court (first federal petition).7" On March
12, 1982, the federal district court denied the first federal petition
without an evidentiary hearing, but issued a certificate of probable
cause. 79 On March 12, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued a stay of execution pending appeal of the first denial
of a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court.8 0 While this
appeal was pending, the defendant filed a second petition for state
writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of San Diego County
on April 16, 1982 (third state petition)."' The second state petition
was denied on May 4, 1982, and the California Supreme Court re-
fused to review that decision on June 30, 1982.82 On August 13,
1982, the defendant filed a second petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 USC section 2254 in federal district court
(second federal petition). (This occurred while the defendant's first
petition to the federal court was being appealed to the federal ap-
peals court.)8 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the fed-
eral district court's denial of the defendant's first federal petition
due to the state supreme court's failure to conduct proportionality
review required under state law.8' In vacating the lower court's de-
cision, the circuit court instructed the federal district court to
change the defendant's death sentence to life imprisonment, unless
the California Supreme Court determined that the penalty im-
posed on the defendant was proportionate to sentences imposed
for similar crimes as required by state law. 5 The state filed a peti-
tion for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court seeking its
review of the court of appeals' decision. 6 In 1984, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of ap-
peals.8 7 The Court considered whether proportionality review, as
mandated by the court of appeals, is required by the United States
Constitution.8 The Court held that a federal writ of habeas







84. Id. (See Harris v Pulley, 692 F2d 1189 (9th Cir 1982)).
85. Id. (See Harris v Pulley, 692 F2d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir 1982)).
86. Id. (See Pulley v Harris, 460 US 1036 (1983)).
87. Pulley v Harris, 465 US 37 (1984).
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prisoner's custody is in violation of the laws or Constitution of the
United States." The Court further stated that a federal court may
not issue the writ on the basis of perceived errors of state law.9 °
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then affirmed the federal dis-
trict court and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings unaffected by the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion.91 Upon remand, the federal district court consolidated the
unresolved issues of the first and second federal habeas petitions,
denied the consolidated petition for federal writ of habeas corpus,
and issued a certificate of probable cause.2 In July of 1988, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's denial of the de-
fendant's consolidated petitions for federal habeas corpus and va-
cated the stay of execution.9 3 The defendant sought, and was de-
nied, a third federal writ of habeas corpus (third federal
petition).9 4 On March 28, 1990, the defendant petitioned the fed-
eral court of appeals to issue a certificate of probable cause to ap-
peal the denial of the writ by the federal district court.9 5 The de-
fendant alleged that he was denied competent psychiatric
assistance during the penalty phase of the trial.96 The court of ap-
peals granted the certificate of probable cause and stayed the exe-
cution until further action by the court. 7
To date, it has been twelve years since the commission of the
crime, eleven years since judgment by the state trial court, and
nine years since the affirmance by the state supreme court. The
case has been in federal court for nine years on questions unrelated
to guilt, which guilt has been established, but on questions related
to sentencing. There have been three state petitions for writ of
habeas corpus, three petitions for federal writ of habeas corpus,
and numerous appeals at the state and federal level. Yet, the sen-
tencing phase has not been settled.
In discussing the problems, the headings are necessarily genera-
lized. Any exhaustive attempt to detail the problems of particular
judicial or statutory provisions would go beyond the scope of this
comment. In addition, when a detailed discussion of the reform
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Harris v Pulley, 852 F2d 1546, 1551.
92. Id.
93. Id at 1574.
94. Harris v Vasquez, 901 F2d 724 (9th Cir 1990).
95. Id at 725.
96. Id at 726.
97. Id at 727.
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proposals is set forth, many of the particularized problems will be
addressed. In the following part of this comment, the problems are
those set forth in the Powell Committee Report.
A. The Need for Counsel
According to the Powell Committee Report, one of the most
pressing problems in reforming federal habeas corpus in capital
cases is the need to provide qualified counsel at the state and fed-
eral level during collateral proceedings.98 The Task Force Report
also identified this as a problem in death penalty cases, but would
seek to solve the problem by providing qualified and adequately
compensated counsel at the state trial, appellate level and post-
conviction collateral proceedings.9 The Task Force Report posits
that the causes of inadequate representation of defendants facing
capital punishment are: lack of financial incentives to counsel to
develop an expertise and the absence of a general right to counsel
in post-conviction review in state court systems.100 Arguably,
problems related to exhaustion of state remedies, procedural de-
faults, ineffective assistance of counsel and other concerns would
less likely have occurred at the state level had more qualified coun-
sel been handling the defense proceedings. The problem of indi-
gent defendants handling pro se procedures compounds the di-
lemma.101  By removing the errors and defaults commonly
associated with unqualified counsel, or, at the least, providing a
defendant with a fair chance at presenting all of his claims, some
finality to the process can begin to occur. Additionally, until indi-
gent defendants are provided with counsel who are adequately
compensated, the system will fail to attract the most competent
counsel, who, by the forces of supply and demand, will necessarily
gravitate towards defendants who have the resources necessary to
conduct the most competent defense strategy."0 2 Under current
federal law imposing capital sentences, specifically the Anti-Drug
98. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 4 (August 1989).
99. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 45-76 (October 1989).
100. Id at 70.
101. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 4 (August 1989).
102. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 70-77 (October 1989).
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Abuse Act of 1988,103 the appointment of adequately qualified
counsel is required for defendants in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. 104 Regardless of whether this issue is framed in terms of
providing adequate counsel for collateral proceedings or providing
qualified counsel through all stages of trial, appeal and post-con-
viction, it is conceded that this is the most pressing issue and the
one that, if solved, may lead to introducing some finality into the
process of federal habeas proceedings.
B. Unnecessary Delay and Repetition
The Powell Committee Report identified unnecessary delay and
repetition as another problem with federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings.0 5 In federal habeas corpus proceedings, there often exists lit-
tle coordination between the federal and state legal systems which
leads to inefficiency and a course of litigation burdened with un-
necessary steps.1 0 6 The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies
leads to prisoners spending significant amounts of time moving be-
tween the state and federal systems, adding to delay and repeti-
tion.1"7 Another source of delay is the frequent litigation over mo-
tions for stays of execution. 08 Delay is also caused by the current
procedures which offer no incentive for a prisoner to initiate collat-
eral proceedings until an execution date is set. 0 9 As previously ex-
plained, because the principle of res judicata is inapplicable in fed-
eral habeas proceedings, piecemeal and repetitive litigation of
claims is common. 110 Finally, although the rules regarding succes-
sive petitions and abuse of writ were intended to prevent endless
filing of frivolous claims, they have not served their intended
purpose. 1
C. Last Minute Litigation
The Powell Committee Report addressed the problem of litiga-
tion of Constitutional claims prompted by the setting of an execu-
103. Cited in note 69.
104. 21 USC § 848(q)(4-10) (1988).
105. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas









tion date.112 This last minute litigation often ill serves justice by
conducting judicial proceedings under the pressures of time.1 1 3 The
merits of a case should be reviewed carefully without the time
pressures involved in last minute federal stay of execution proceed-
ings.11 Once a full and final review has taken place, further last
minute litigation should not occur absent extraordinary circum-
stances.115 The Task Force Report also recognized that "chaotic"
litigation, due to the time pressure of impending execution, occurs
incident to stays of execution.1 "
IV. THE POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT
The major goal of the recommendations in this report was that:
"Capital cases should be subject to one complete and fair course of
collateral review in the state and federal system, free from the time
pressure of impending execution, and with the assistance of com-
petent counsel for the defendant." 17 In order to implement this
goal, the committee proposed redesignating the current 28 USC
sections 2241-2255 of Chapter 153 HABEAS CORPUS, as Sub-
chapter A, and adding a new Subchapter B entitled, "CAPITAL
CASES: SPECIAL PROCEDURES," encompassing new sections
2256-2260.11s
Section 2256 of the new Subchapter B, would deal with those
prisoners who are seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to sec-
tion 2254, i.e., in state custody subject to a capital sentence. 9 This
section would apply only if the state, by rule of a court of last re-
sort or by statute, adopts a mechanism for appointing qualified
and reasonably compensated counsel in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings brought by indigent'prisoners whose decisions have be-
come final for state law purposes.1 20 The proposed section further
provides that no counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner
under capital sentence shall have previously represented the pris-




116. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 219 (October 1989).
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Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 6 (August 1989).
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oner at trial or on direct review unless expressly requested. 2'
Under this section, the ineffectiveness of counsel during state and
federal collateral review, in a capital case, shall not be a ground for
relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.122 If section 2256
were implemented, it would limit, except in unusual capital cases,
each prisoner to a full, fair and final opportunity for federal habeas
corpus review under section 2254.123 In order to incorporate this
more structured form of habeas corpus, systems for the appoint-
ment and compensation of qualified counsel would have to be
designed and implemented for all stages of post-conviction re-
view. 2 " Note, the provisions of the new subchapter B are op-
tional;'25 a state could opt to operate under the current section
2254 and the case law currently applicable to federal habeas corpus
cases. 2 ' The provisions related to the appointment of new counsel
in the state post-conviction phase of capital cases are, nonetheless,
an effort to limit the use of the ineffective assistance of counsel
argument that frequently pervades collateral proceedings. 1'
A new section 2257 would require mandatory stays of execution
provided that the state has invoked the post-conviction review pro-
cedures of Subchapter B regarding the appointment of counsel. 2 '
The stay provisions would expire under the following conditions: 1)
failure to file the habeas petition under section 2254 within the
time requirements of 2258 (180 days), 2) denial of federal lower
court review under Section 2254 where certiorari to the Supreme
Court is no longer an option, or 3) waiver of the right to pursue
habeas corpus under 2254 by the state prisoner.'29 If a stay has
expired under any of the foregoing provisions, no federal court
shall have authority to enter a stay, unless the stay's basis is: 1) a
claim not previously presented to the state or federal court, 2) fail-
ure to raise the claim as a result of state action in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, 3) recognition by the Supreme
Court of a new right to be applied retroactively in collateral pro-
ceedings, or 4) a claim based on a factual predicate that could not
have been previously discovered and that undermines the accuracy
121. Id at 10.
122. Id.
123. Id at 10-11.
124. Id at 11.
125. Id at 6.
126. Id at 11.
127. Id at 12.
128. Id at 13-14.
129. Id at 14.
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of the conviction.13 The goal of section 2257 is to eliminate stay of
execution litigation.131 Stays of execution are mandatory and will
remain in force, provided the state prisoner files for federal habeas
corpus under section 2254 within the 180 day period proscribed in
section 2258.132
A new section 2258 would require that any petition for habeas
corpus under section 2254 be filed within 180 days from the filing,
in state court, of an order complying with section 2256 (appoint-
ment of counsel provisions). 33 However, the time requirements es-
tablished under section 2258 shall be tolled from the time the pris-
oner petitions the Supreme Court for certiorari until the final
disposition of that petition by the Supreme Court.13' Tolling shall
also take place while a state prisoner, under capital sentence, has
filed for post-conviction review in state court, and shall run until
final disposition by the highest court of the state. 1 5 Tolling also
occurs for an additional 60 days if counsel moves for an extension
of time in the federal district court and shows good cause for his
failure to meet the 180-day federal habeas filing requirement.
136
The comment to this section notes that the state interest in pro-
moting finality in its judicial determinations is adequately ad-
dressed and served by the 180-day filing requirement. 137 However,
the state can only advance this finality interest if the state pro-
vides a prisoner under capital sentence with competent counsel,
who will fully assert the prisoner's claims in post-conviction pro-
ceedings.'38 The end result of this section is that if the state is
complying with section 2256, regarding the appointment of coun-
sel, a prisoner need not file for federal habeas corpus while his case
is pending in state court. 139 Once the state post-conviction review
process is final, the 180 day period begins to run again if the capi-
tal sentence is undisturbed. 140 A state prisoner must then file a sec-
tion 2254 petition in federal district court within 180 days."4 De-
130. Id at 14-15.
131. Id at 15.
132. Id at 15-16.
133. Id at 18.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id at 18-19.
137. Id at 19.
138. Id.
139. Id at 20.
140. Id at 20-21.
141. Id at 21.
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fault in the 180-day rule will not occur if a state prisoner's counsel,
in the proper discharge of his duties, proceeds in a responsible
manner."' If counsel should experience difficulty in filing, a 60 day
extension by the federal district court will be granted where good
cause is shown.' 43
A new section 2259 would define the scope of federal review in
capital cases. Under this section, a federal district court would be
authorized to entertain only those federal claims raised and liti-
gated in the state courts."" A petitioner's claim that was not
presented to the state court can only be considered by the district
court if: 1) the claim results from state action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, 2) the claim is the result
of the Supreme Court's recognition of a new federal right that is to
be applied retroactively, or 3) the claim is based on facts that
could not have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence. 45 Section 2259 represents a departure from Rose v Lundy'"
as far as unexhausted claims are concerned. 4 7 This section would
bar the prisoner from trying to exhaust his unexhausted claims un-
less one of the three exceptions, previously outlined, was
applicable.
1 48
Finally, a new section 2260 would deal with the certificate of
probable cause.' 49 The certificate of probable cause, required to ap-
peal from the federal district court to the court of appeals, would
not be applicable to habeas corpus cases subject to the new sub-
chapter B, except where a second or successive petition was
filed.' 50
V. THE TASK FORCE REPORT
The Task Force Report enumerated several goals. These in-
cluded: 1) providing recommendations that would produce state
and federal review procedures for death penalty cases that are co-
ordinated, 2) efficiently using court resources, 3) producing cer-
tainty that no executions will take place that are flawed because of
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id at 22.
145. Id at 21.
146. Cited in note 14.
147. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 22 (August 1989).
148. Id at 10.




procedural error, and 4) avoiding the practice of chaotic last min-
ute state and federal review.151 The proposals and recommenda-
tions of this committee incorporate changes into the existing provi-
sions of 28 USC sections 2241-2255.
The first of these recommended changes applies to section 2241
regarding the power to grant a writ. The Task Force report adds a
new section (e) to section 2241; this section 2241(e) specifically ad-
dresses habeas corpus relief under 2254 when a capital sentence is
imposed. 15 These changes institute a one-year limitations period
within which a petitioner under capital sentence must file his
habeas claim in the appropriate district court.153 The one-year lim-
itations period runs from 1) the date of denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court, 2) the date of the final decision of the highest
state court if certiorari was not filed with the Supreme Court, or 3)
the date the Supreme Court disposes of the petition for certiorari
leaving the sentence undisturbed."" This new addition also pro-
vides for tolling provisions from the time requirements in the fol-
lowing instances: 1) where the prisoner was not represented by
counsel, 2) during the pendency of all properly filed post-convic-
tion review, 3) during a 90 day extension of time where good cause
is shown.1 55 Finally, the revisions to section 2241 provide sanctions
for non-compliance.' 5 For example, if a petitioner fails to comply
with the time requirements, the petition will be dismissed, except
where the petitioner presents a colorable claim, not previously
presented, of either factual innocence or ineligibility for the death
penalty.'57
The next proposed change occurs in section 2243 regarding issu-
ance of a writ. Again, specifically addressing the case where a peti-
tioner is under sentence of death, the change provides that stays of
execution shall be granted by the appropriate court, pursuant to
section 2254, while a petitioner is pursuing any pending litiga-
tion.158 The stay of execution shall expire 1) if a state prisoner
failed to file a habeas corpus petition in a timely manner under the
151. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 38 (October 1989).
152. Id at 361-362.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id at 362.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id at 364.
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new language of section 2241, 2) if a district court and court of
appeals denied relief under 2254, the time for filing a petition for
writ of certiorari expired, the writ of certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court or the Supreme Court considered the case and left
it undisturbed, or 3) if a state prisoner waived the power to stay
after being advised of the consequences of his decision.'
59
Section 2244, as revised, concerns finality of determination, suc-
cessive petitions, and abuse of a writ. Again, the changes address
the case of a petitioner under a sentence of death. The new section
would require that a second or successive petition for habeas relief
be dismissed unless 1) the request was based on a previously un-
presented claim in state or federal court, where the failure to pre-
sent resulted from state action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, a recognition of a new federal right held
retroactive by the Supreme Court, or based on a factual predicate
previously undiscoverable, 2) the request involved issues of factual
innocence, or 3) granting the request was necessary to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.160
Additions to section 2253 provide that a certificate of probable
cause is not required for an appeal where a prisoner is under sen-
tence of death and the federal district court denied the writ. 6 '
However, a certificate of probable cause is required after the denial
of a second or successive petition.'62
The current section 2254 allows the federal judiciary to issue a
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody, pursuant to
state court judgment, on the ground that such custody violates the
Constitution or laws of the United States. The Task Force's propo-
sal changes current section 2254(a) by adding that when a peti-
tioner's claim undermines the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing
determination, governing law shall be that law in force at the time
the court considers the petition. 6 3 The current section 2254(d) is
reworded to provide that a petitioner under sentence of death shall
not be dismissed on state procedural default rules due to the igno-
rance or neglect of the prisoner or his counsel, if the failure to con-
sider such a claim would result in a miscarriage of justice.6 4
The most sweeping changes to section 2254 occur in the addition
159. Id.
160. Id at 365.






of a new section 2254(h), dealing with the mechanism for appoint-
ment of counsel.'6" This added section requires capital punishment
states to have a system for appointing counsel for indigents
charged with capital offenses or indigents who seek appellate or
collateral relief in state court or certiorari review in the United
States Supreme Court. 166 Where the appointment of counsel is
made before trial, at least one appointed attorney must have been
admitted to practice for not less than five years and have no less
than three years' experience in prosecution trials. 67 Where ap-
pointment is made after trial, at least one attorney must have been
admitted to practice in the state court of last resort not less than
five years and have no less than three years' experience in handling
felony appeals.16 8 The section, if adopted, would allow for a waiver
of these minimum requirements where ability, based on certain
factors, dictates.16 This section would also allow for provision of
investigative or expert services where necessary to adequately re-
present the defendant. 170 Furthermore, under section 2254(h)
courts are permitted to fix reasonable amounts of compensation for
the counsel appointed and any investigative or expert services inci-
dent thereto.
171
According to the Task Force Report's suggestions, the exhaus-
tion of state remedies provisions of section 2254(b), the rules in-
volving state procedural default under section 2254(c) and the pre-
sumption of correctness of state court findings of fact under
Section 2254(d), would not apply where the counsel and compensa-
tion provisions had not been implemented. 72 Counsel appointed
for the trial phase would be ineligible to represent the defendant
on appeal, unless both the defendant and counsel expressly re-
quested otherwise, the defendant was informed of the conse-
quences of the decision by the state court, and the defendant, on
the record, waived the right to new counsel. 7 a Finally, in proceed-
ings after a direct appeal, the ineffectiveness or incompetence of an
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appointed counsel would not be a ground for relief. 74
VI. THE ABA REPORT
The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Report
to the House of Delegates 7 5 is essentially an adoption of the ABA
Task Force Report, except for the provisions relating to the ap-
pointment of counsel in federal habeas corpus capital cases. The
ABA report adopts very structured provisions for the appointment
of counsel in capital cases. Under proposed subsection (h) of sec-
tion 2254, the ABA Report would require capital punishment
states to have a statewide appointing authority which would pro-
vide qualified counsel and co-counsel during trial, appeal and post
conviction proceedings for indigents charged with capital of-
fenses.176 The statewide appointing authority would consist of a
statewide defender organization, and either a capital litigation re-
source center or a special committee constituted by the state court
of last resort. 7 The statewide appointing authority would be re-
sponsible for recruiting qualified attorneys, drafting and publish-
ing certification standards, periodically reviewing and monitoring
the attorneys appointed, conducting specialized training programs,
and actually appointing the certified attorneys to represent indi-
gent defendants in capital cases. 78 The report then lists the mini-
mum qualifications of lead trial counsel. These qualifications in-
clude active trial practice with at least five years criminal litigation
experience, prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than nine
jury trials of complex cases (including at least three murder trials),
familiarity with practice and procedure in criminal cases, and suc-
cessful completion of criminal advocacy training. 7 9 The minimum
qualifications of trial co-counsel would include active trial practice
with at least three years criminal litigation experience, prior expe-
rience as lead or co-counsel in no fewer that three complex trials
(including at least two murder cases), and familiarity with practice
and procedure in criminal cases. 80 The report then lists the mini-
mum qualifications for lead appellate counsel as follows: active
174. Id.
175. American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Dele-
gates (February 1990).
176. Id at B-28.
177. Id.
178. Id at B-29.
179. Id at B-29, 30.
180. Id at B-30, 31.
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trial or appellate practice with a minimum of three years experi-
ence in criminal defense, prior experience (within the last three
years) in appeal of at least three felony convictions (including at
least one involving the appeal of a murder conviction), familiarity
with practice and procedure of appellate courts, and successful
completion of training in appellate advocacy."81 Appellate co-coun-
sel would also have minimum qualifications similar to those of lead
counsel.'"2 The report then details the qualifications of lead post
conviction counsel and co-counsel, incorporating many of the mini-
mum qualifications from the categories previously set forth. 183
The recommendations include a provision for investigative and-
expert services upon an ex parte finding that such services are nec-
essary to adequately present the issues to the appropriate court.184
In addition, the court is permitted to set reasonable hourly rates of
compensation for the attorneys appointed under these provisions,.
provided the compensation reflects an amount commensurate with
the extensive services provided in capital cases."8 '
The ABA's suggestions provide sanctions against those state
convictions that have not employed the appointment of counsel
provisions of proposed subsection 2254(h). Specifically, the exhaus-
tion of state remedies provisions of section 2254(b), the provisions
involving state procedural default rules of section 2254(c), and the
presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact under
section 2254(d), would be inapplicable if the counsel provisions of
subsection (h) were not implemented.'8 6 Finally, the proposal
would make counsel who represented the defendant in the capital
trial ineligible to represent the defendant on appeal, unless both
the defendant and counsel expressly requested to maintain the sta-
tus quo, the state court informed the appellant of the conse-
quences of the decision, and such waiver of new counsel was made
part of the record.
18 7
VII. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSALS
The Powell Committee Report, The Task Force Report and the
ABA Report all recognize and address the key issue of providing
181. Id at B-31.
182. Id at B-32.
183. Id at B-32, 33.






counsel for indigent defendants charged with capital offenses. Each
report also provides sanctions for non-compliance. The Powell
Committee Report does not provide substantive guidelines for pro-
viding counsel, instead it leaves the job of setting such standards
to the individual state legislatures or state courts of last resort.' 88
Moreover, the Powell Committee Report makes the provisions of
its Subchapter B, dealing with capital cases, optional for the states
to implement. 89 This, in effect, creates a bifurcated statute. If the
provisions of sections 2256 through 2260 (Subchapter B) are not
adopted, the provisions of sections 2241 through 2255 (the current
federal law) and case law construing those sections will continue to
define the rules of federal habeas corpus in capital cases.19 ° How-
ever, the Powell Committee Report strongly urges the individual
states to adopt the procedures of sections 2256-2260. These proce-
dures make a valid attempt to introduce some finality into the pro-
cess of federal habeas review and encourage respect for state court
judgments. The advantage of adopting the proposed Subchapter B
procedures is that state judicial systems will forego operating
under the current system of federal habeas review with its chaotic,
rej~etitive and delaying procedures. The Powell Committee Report
makes clear that only by adopting some method of counsel provi-
sion will state court judgments move toward the goal of federal
habeas corpus becoming a "one full and final review" procedure.
The Powell Committee Report leaves to the judiciary the determi-
nation of -whether the individual states have met the burden of
providing adequate counsel services to indigent defendants facing
capital charges. 91 This position has the disadvantage of possibly
producing delay while judicial standards are decided; however, de-
lay is a possibility, albeit a less distinct one, even under the very
detailed and structured counsel provision of the ABA Report. Fi-
nally, the Powell Committee Report has the advantage of preclud-
ing an argument based upon ineffectiveness of counsel if the state
has implemented counsel appointment mechanisms. 9"
The ABA Report is by far the most extensive in providing sub-
stantive guidelines for the provision of counsel for indigent defend-
ants facing capital charges. The report provides an excellent proto-
188. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 9 (August 1989).
189. Id at 6.
190. Id at 11.
191. Id.
192. Id at 10.
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type for the type of system a state could employ using the optional
provisions of the Powell Committee Report. The ABA Report dif-
fers from the Powell Committee Report regarding counsel provi-
sions in one very important respect. Failure to implement the ABA
report proposals would result in state courts forfeiting the benefit
of the current rules regarding exhaustion of state remedies, proce-
dural default, and the presumption of correctness of state court
factual findings. 193 While the Powell Committee Report divides the
proposed federal habeas law into two sections (one including the
current provisions and the other including optional provisions re-
garding capital cases); the ABA Report incorporates its proposals
into the current federal law thus making compliance mandatory;
while failure to comply would result in penalties on important
state interests. This may have the advantage of forcing state com-
pliance, but it does not promote the single most pervasive issue in
federal habeas corpus proceedings, namely, the federalism issue.
Mandating federal guidelines for the procedures employed in state
courts would be a dangerous first step toward future federal intru-
sion into the state processes of judicial administration.
The Task Force Report is essentially the same as the ABA Re-
port but lacks the latter's substantive guidelines for appointing
counsel. The Task Force Report would also make compliance
mandatory by forcing state courts to forfeit the benefits of the
rules on exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, and pre-
sumption of correctness if the counsel provision recommendations
are not employed. 194 The Task Force Report also precludes the in-
effectiveness of counsel argument where the appointment of coun-
sel provisions have been implemented. 9 5
Each proposal contains provisions addressing the more genera-
lized problems of unnecessary delay and repetition in federal
habeas corpus capital cases by providing for time limitations and
tolling requirements. The Powell Committee Report provides for
mandatory stays of execution. This proposal recognizes that stay of
execution litigation is often the cause of repetitive and unnecessary
delay in federal court. Therefore, in the new section 2257, the Pow-
ell Committee Report sets forth a clear policy of mandatory stay of
193. American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Dele-
gates B-34 (February 1990).
194. Cited in note 172.
195. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 371 (October 1989).
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execution if the prisoner files a federal habeas corpus application
pursuant to section 2254 within the time period of the new 2258
(180 days). 9 6 The clear intent of the proposal is not to produce
default mechanisms, but to promote a clear method of moving the
case to resolution on its merits coincident with adequate counsel.'97
This provision is an important first step toward putting the burden
on the prisoner to timely file for the federal writ or risk expiration
of stay of execution procedures. However, the provision provides
safeguards against expiration where the basis for relief is a claim
not previously presented in state or federal court, or there has
been either unconstitutional state action, retroactive recognition of
new rights, or discovery of new facts leading to innocence. 98 As
previously mentioned, these provisions put the burden on the peti-
tioner to timely move his habeas claims toward resolution, rather
than seeking any delaying mechanism. The tolling rules of the
Powell Committee Report adequately recognize that the time re-
quirements should be tolled while post-conviction review is pend-
ing, with such time requirements enforced once direct review is
completed by the highest court of the state.'9 9 The Powell proposal
has the advantage, assuming counsel provisions have been adopted,
of providing full state direct review and federal habeas review un-
hampered by exhaustive and last minute stay of execution litiga-
tion. The Powell proposal has the distinct advantage of promoting
the goal of one full and final review in federal habeas corpus. Addi-
tionally, the Powell proposal has the advantage of promoting issues
of fairness to the defendant, and promoting issues of finality to the
state in the effective judicial enforcement of its decisions.
The ABA and the Task Force Reports are the same in every re-
spect save the standards for the provision of counsel. Both reports
provide for time filing requirements and tolling provisions.
Whereas the Powell Committee Report provides a six month time
requirement for filing, these reports provide for a one year require-
ment.200 The Powell Committee Report tolls the filing requirement
while post-conviction review is taking place until a final decision
196. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 15-16 (August 1989).
197. Id at 16.
198. Id at 14-15.
199. Id at 18.
200. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 361-62 (October 1989).
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by the state highest court.201 The ABA and Task Force Reports
toll the filing requirement while certiorari is being sought in the
United States Supreme Court.20 2 Tolling while certiorari is being
sought is an unnecessary provision, because if the state prisoner
petitions for a federal writ of habeas corpus directly after the final
state court judgement, the merits of any unconstitutional depriva-
tion will be heard. In order to promote timely resolution of uncon-
stitutional confinement, the only logical step is to proceed right to
the federal court on habeas grounds and reach the claim. The ABA
and Task Force Reports also provide sanctions for failure to timely
file, which can be waived when the petitioner has presented a col-
orable claim that has not been previously presented because of ei-
ther factual innocence or the petitioner's ineligibility for the death
penalty.203 The exception regarding the petitioner's ineligibility for
the death penalty is undefined, and has the disadvantage of pro-
moting delay in a process that is already lacking in finality.
Since many of the changes in the'ABA and Task Force Reports
occur with the current section 2254, those changes should be ad-
dressed independently. The addition to section 2254(a) states that
a petitioner under sentence of death, making any claim undermin-
ing the accuracy of guilt or sentencing, shall be governed by the
law at the time of petition.20 4 This, in effect, jettisons the decisions
of Teague v Lane0 5 and Penry v Lynaugh.20 6 The goal of habeas
corpus reform should be to institute some finality into the process.
The section 2254(a) test would not, in effect, make either state or
federal processes final. Likewise section 2254(d), as proposed, jetti-
sons state procedural default rules by barring denial of relief be-
cause of the petitioner's failure to raise a claim in state court in a
timely manner, where the prisoner shows that the failure was due
to ignorance or neglect of the prisoner or where failure to consider
the claim would result in a miscarriage of justice.20 7 If competent
201. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 18 (August 1989).
202. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 361-62 (October 1989).
203. Id at 362.
204. Id at 368.
205. Cited in note 49.
206. Cited in note 50.
207. Recommendations and Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases 368 (October 1989).
Vol. 29:61
Comments
counsel has been provided as a method of avoiding error or incom-
petence, it seems that ignorance or negligent failure to raise a
claim should be precisely precluded. If these elaborate procedures
for the appointment of competent counsel at various stages of trial
and review are to be implemented, yet thwarted by claims of igno-
rance or negligence, why argue to provide competent counsel in the
first place? Furthermore, there would be no incentive for states to
adopt such procedures (assuming that some deference to state ju-
dicial systems would be granted).
Proposed section 2254(h) provides the qualifications for counsel.
The advantage of this proposal is that it provides concrete mecha-
nisms for the appointment of qualified counsel for all levels of trial
and review. The disadvantage of this proposal is that it is
mandatory. The states' certainly have an individual finality inter-
est in adopting counsel provisions, but each individual state should
have the option of adopting the plan. The interests of federalism
demand that deference be accorded state judicial procedures. An-
other disadvantage of this proposal is that in the event of a state's
non-compliance with the appointment of counsel provisions, the
state forfeits the exhaustion of state remedies provided in section
2254(b), the rules relating to procedural default as provided in sec-
tion 2254(c), and the presumption of correctness as provided in
section 2254(d). °8
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the interest of brevity, this comment did not explore the his-
tory and scope of habeas corpus. However, one can conclude with-
out much dispute that, over the past forty years, the writ of habeas
corpus has been greatly expanded from its original utilization.
Whether this expansion has had positive or negative impacts is
subject to disagreement. As Judge Friendly once stated:
Legal history has many instances where a remedy initially serving a felt
need has expanded bit by bit, without much thought being given to any
single step, until it has assumed an aspect so different from its origin as to
demand reappraisal-agonizing or not. That, in my view, is what happened
with respect to collateral attack on criminal convictions. After trial, convic-
tion, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court, in proceedings where the defendant had the assistance of counsel at
every step, the criminal process, in Winston Churchill's phrase, has not
reached the end, or even the beginning of the end, but only the end of the
beginning. Any murmur of dissatisfaction with this situation provokes im-
208. Cited in note 172.
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mediate incantation of the Great Writ, with the inevitable initial capitals,
often accompanied by a suggestion that the objector is the sort of person
who would cheerfully desecrate the Ark of the Covenant." 9
The three reform proposals are not an effort to desecrate the
Great Writ, but rather, an effort to restore some finality into the
procedures employed in federal habeas corpus involving capital
cases, while providing adequate safeguards to protect the interests
of the petitioner. The Powell Committee Report takes the most
clearly defined steps toward providing a full and fair mechanism
for promoting finality interests in federal habeas corpus in capital
cases. Furthermore, the Powell Committee Report recognizes im-
portant federalism concerns that must be taken into account in
any reform proposal and adequately protects the interests of the
defendant in obtaining recourse for an illegal detention.
Jerome J. Kaharick
209. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack On Criminal
Judgments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970).
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